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This paper examines empirical evidence on SOE performance drivers and thus contributes to 
understanding the literature behind SOE performance as well contributions to policy formulation 
on such organizations. Data from annual reports of 24 SOEs selected from 9 countries across 7 
industries in a regression model empirically estimated using linear mixed model within the 
framework of longitudinal data analysis. The study finds that in an SOE set up, good firm 
performance is driven by existence of strong boards, good liquidity position and independent 
industry regulation. Firm size and age are also found to be positively driving performance whilst 
gearing levels, government’s involvement in pricing, attempting to cater for all stakeholder 
interest and financial dependence on government are negatively related to performance of SOEs. 
Our study brings no conclusive result on the effect industry competition has on SOE 
performance. We conclude that SOE performance can be explained in terms of the following 
organizational theories: resource based theory, agency theory, stewardship theory and the public 
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1.0 Introduction  
The debate on the relevance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Africa has been around for some time, 
dating as far back as early 1950s and gaining momentum throughout sub-Saharan Africa by the 1980s 
(Etukudo, (1997). However to date such debates have concentrated on SOE ownership structures, 
managerial autonomy, commercialization and privatization and thereby missing on a very central issue; 
what are the factors driving good SOE performance?  The quest in the academic literature as well as in 
policy endeavors to explain SOE performance has not yielded much consensus, given the inability of 
certain theories to adequately explain SOE performance (Bozec et al, (2002). Whilst empirical evidence 
exists on how well and/or poor SOEs have performed over the years, what remains largely unresolved, at 
least in the context of sub Saharan Africa, is a comprehensive test of what factors drive good SOE 
performance? Of equal importance is an examination of the rather contending organizational theories to 
determine how they combine to explain and predict organizational performance of SOEs, these are gaps 
this paper intends to fill.     
Whilst various countries have, in concert with the agency theory embarked on performance contracts in 
an effort to improve SOE efficiency these have failed fundamentally because such attempts have 
underestimated the implications of other competing theories which explain organizational performance. 
Chile provides a good example where contradictions amongst such competing organizational performance 
theories were revealed, whilst exemplary efficiency of SOEs was brought about in compliance with the 
tenets of the agency theory (boards were trimmed and made more efficient, management roles more 
defined etc.), the provisions of the stewardship theory were rather undermined (board oversight functions 
were strengthened, management supervision was more evident etc.). On the other hand, good 
performance was ensured through restrained political influence with boards being held more accountable, 
a scenario supported under the public choice theory, however socio economic dimensions coming with 
the existence of SOEs were ignored and thereby giving much less attention to the needs and interest of 
various stakeholders (Shirley, (2008). 
 
Another example lies in a study by Mwaura (2007) who, consistent with Toninelli (2000) blames poor 
performance of Kenyan SOEs on poor performance by the boards, and attributes their inability to resolve 
the agent-principal problem because of the existence of multiple agents (managers, state and public 
officials). However, attempting to resolve the agency problem purely by giving the boards autonomy will 
test the principles of the public choice theory, as such board are appointed by political leadership to 
facilitate political millage through directives not necessarily in the best interest of the SOE’s performance 
(Mwaura, (2007).  
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SOEs are generally associated with a dark history of poor performance (Boko & YuanJan, (2011), thereby 
prompting governments to focus on privitisation which also got a push from DFIs. Unfortunately existing 
empirical evidence is not so conclusive in projecting privitisation as a solution to poor performance of 
SOEs and many studies continue to find no causal relationship between privitisation and better firm 
performance (Fritz & Menocal,( 2006) , Buchs, (2003), Omran, (2001), Omran, (2002), Kanyoma, 
(2008), Cheelo & Mwanalula (2005).  
In the midst of these, compelling evidence continue to indicate that as old business concepts as they are, 
SOEs still remain relevant in today’s economies. SOEs account for 20% and 5% of global investments 
and total employment respectively and up to 40% of total output in some countries (World Bank, (2007). 
There exist a good number of examples of SOEs that have, and continue to bring desired results to their 
economies. In many OECD countries SOEs have for some time represented a substantial part of GDP, 
employment and market capitalization, such entities have been  prevalent in key sectors such as energy, 
transport and telecommunications whose performance is critical to broad segments of the population and 
other parts of the business sector (OECD, (2005). A good number of successful SOEs include the multi 
award winning Singapore Airlines Brazil’s EMBAER, the French Renault, Korean POSCO and the 
highly respected Indian Bombay Transport Authority Cheng (2007). Similarly Qatar airlines voted the 
World’s best airline of 2011 (SkyTrax,( 2011) is a major player in the country’s economy with a majority 
shareholding by the Government. The importance of SOEs is felt particularly on infrastructural 
development, with a majority of infrastructural services being delivered by SOEs ahead of a 20% to 25% 
contribution by the private sector (Vagliasindi, (2008).  
These are all relevant facts which policy discussions and debates cannot continue to ignore, particularly 
so in the context of the relatively less developed sub-Sahara Africa where SOEs continue to operate 
virtually in all sectors, Kikeri and Kolo (2006). It is therefore of paramount importance that factors 
affecting performance in these critical entities are well comprehended and so in the context of a 
framework of well-founded organizational theories. 
 
A number of empirical studies have been performed in Africa in the subject of SOE performance, but 
more often focusing on how privatization affects organizational performance as opposed to what 
fundamentally drives such performance. In that regard, Marandu (2003) examines how privatization 
affects SOE performance in Dar-es-Salaam and finds no significant improvement on firm performance 
purely attributable to privitization.  Kanyoma, (2008) using a 10-year data to investigate performance 
trends before and after privatization also fails to establish any material positive impact privatization has 
on firm performance, the same goes for a Ghana based study by Ntiri, (2010).  Other similar studies 
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conducted in this area (Cheelo & Mwanalula, (2005), Mosoke, (2008), Omran, 2001, Clive (2004) also 
does not really assist in defining factors to consider if SOE performance is to be improved and how 
performance could be explained and predicted in terms of existing organizational theory.  
On a study that compares organizational performance before and after privatization,   (China provides a 
very good case of the good that can come with the embracing of SOEs through corporatization as a policy 
alternative to pure privatization (Aivazian et al, (2005). Even then, such corporatization has to come with 
and be backed by a solid understanding of how to run self-sustaining SOEs and this has to be informed by 
a reflection on what drives good performance and how existing theory explains and predict such 
performance.  
This paper examines the fundamental drivers of SOE performance in Africa and seeks to contribute to 
literature and policy discussions on SOEs by uniquely combining various management theory lenses. The 
paper tests various theories: the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, (1976, Eisenhardt, (1989), public 
choice theory (Niskanen, (1971); Tullock, (1976); Krueger (1990), stewardship theory (Donaldson 
,(1990); Barney ,(1990), the stakeholder theory (Freeman, (1994) and the resource based theory (Hamel & 
Prahalad,( 1994) to establish the drivers of SOE performance. It uses data from SOEs from the period 
2001 and from seven (7) sectors and nine (9) countries. The data is sourced from SOE audited annual 
financial statements, enabling acts of Parliament and publicized annual reports. The paper utilizes panel 
data estimation framework to analyze the effect of a number of variables on SOE performance. The paper 
brings clarity to the seemingly contradicting theories that have for years been used to explain and predict 
organizational behavior. The rest of the paper is structured as follows; the next section   reviews relevant 
literature, followed by a section on methodology, a discussion of results and a conclusion respectively.  
2.0. Review of Literature  
2.1. SOEs and the Agency theory 
The agency theory by (Jensen & Meckling, (1976) and  Eisenhardt, (1989) remain very popular amongst 
many modern day researchers in examining and explaining governance relationships between the owners 
of the firms and those entrusted with the responsibilities of managing it. In principal  and agent 
relationships the problem that typical arises is when the agent fails to balance their own interests with 
those of the owners and hence the board of directors are often expected to play an oversight role, keeping 
in mind the interest of the principal. In the case of SOEs, however, the difficulty of defining the ultimate 
principals at SOEs hinders the development of appropriate mechanisms for aligning the agent’s interest 
with the principal’s (Wicaksono, (2009), this problem is also noted in Toninelli, (2000) who labeled 
SOEs managers as ‘agents without principals’. As much as the owner of SOEs is in all most all cases is 
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clearly identified as the state, a confusion often arises as to who is representing the state, is it the central 
government, local government, bureaucrats or the general public? The significance of the agency problem 
in the case of SOE is also emphasized by (Li and Xia,( 2007 who blames it on the inability of the 
Principal to monitor the agent. Empirical evidence have shown that the agency theory’s mal-functionality 
tend to be more pronounced in cases of making managerial choices under uncertainty (Ross, (1973), such 
uncertainty quite often exist in the cases of SOEs where managerial choices (biased towards better 
economic performance) may not fuse well with those of the principal, the state, which may be leaning 
towards socio-political goals.  
Whilst in agreement with Ross, (1973) and Leech, (1986) that an agency problem will ensue whenever 
business preferences of the agents and principals are at variance, (Ongore and K’Obonyo, (2011) posit 
that the use of strong and effective boards can overcome this as they become  intermediaries with an 
oversight fiduciary function. However, earlier empirical evidence in the case of Chinese and Indian SOEs 
has shown that it is not always practical for boards to act against the will of a dominant shareholder 
(Rajagopalan and Zhang, ( 2008). The state is in all cases the dominant shareholder in SOEs and thus, it’s 
will and power always sees the light of the day, implying that the public choice theory will almost 
certainly reinstate itself even in cases where there has been deliberate efforts to keep high standards of 
governance requisite in dealing with the agency-principal problem. 
  
 
2.2. SOEs and the Stakeholder theory 
The stakeholder theory popularized by (Freeman, (1994) is underpinned by the assumption that values are 
necessarily and explicitly part of doing business and put pressure on management to articulate the manner 
in which they want to conduct business with what brings core stakeholders together in mind. Under this 
theory organizational behavior [and performance] is said to be predicted and explained on the basis of its 
stakeholders, their values, their relative influence on decisions and the organizational situation, (Brenner 
& Cochran, 1991, cited in Jones and Wicks, (1999).The fact that this theory demands managers to 
reconcile the needs of all core stakeholders in the way they run business makes it even more appealing to 
an SOE set up where stakeholders are divergent in needs and objectives including those of a social nature 
along with the profit motives (Wicaksono, (2009).  Although this theory sought to describe and explain 
specific corporate characteristics and behaviours, it suffers from not realizing the fact that stakeholders 
may be multiple and possess conflicting interests (Donaldson and Preston, (1995). In such a situation is it 
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feasible for interests of all stakeholders in a typical SOE to be well reconciled in order to achieve a 
sustained organizational performance?  
 
2.3. SOEs and the Stewardship theory 
The Stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davies, 1989; Donaldson ,1990; Barney ,(1990) postulates that 
managers are good stewards of the firm, want to perform well and cooperate with all stakeholders for a 
common goal of attaining the firm overall firm objectives (Wicaksono, (2009), the stewardship theory 
therefore proposes that trustworthy and cooperative relationships between principals and stewards are 
positively correlated with firm performance (Tian and Lau,( 2001). This view is supported by (Yang et al, 
(2009) who find that in the modern world, the relationship between the board and the CEO is no longer a 
supervisor and supervisee one but rather a cooperative engagement. Do such arrangements survive in an 
SOE set up where political influence can overrule? Do management and boards wither political pressures 
exerted on them by powerful political leaders who, in most cases appointed them?  
 
2.4. SOEs and the Public Choice theory 
The public choice theory makes an assumption that although political leadership has some concern for the 
interest of others; such concern is minimal as the primary interest they serve is their’ s. SOEs are state’s 
own vehicles for service delivery, and since states are run and directed by politicians, it follows that 
politicians may have an upper hand in the direction of SOEs.  A key underpinning of the public choice 
theory is the lack of incentives by voters to monitor the actions of the government [and politicians in 
general] (Shaw, (2008). This lack of incentive is often blamed on a rational ignorance on the part of the 
voters (Anthony, (1957, cited in Shaw, (2008) and thus weakens incentive for good management in public 
interest.  
A further problem arises under this theory where focus is diverted to achieving socio political goals [in 
some cases for political expediency] to the detriment of financial performance (Bozec et al, 2002). This 
was also established by (Kathrn et al, (2001) who finds that government owned firms tend to forgo 
maximum profits in pursuit of socio political objectives. This detriment of political control over SOEs is 
corroborated by empirical evidence from a study by (Xu et al, (2001) which found that the success of 
SOE restructuring in China was dependent upon lessening of politician control.  A study by (Bortolotti & 
Pinotti, (2008) concluded that successful alternatives to SOE privatization depended mainly on the will 
and the power of the politicians governing the country, however  such politicians, at least according to the 
public choice theory, do have the power and will act in their own best interest due to weak oversight 




2.5.  SOEs and the Resource Based Theory 
 
The RBT was popularized by among others by (Hamel & Prahalad, (1994) who pictured organizations as 
bundles of resources which, depending on how they are uniquely combined make one firm perform better 
than the next. Consistent with such a proposition, (Grant, (1991) holds a view that firm’s resources are its 
primary source of good performance.  A study by (Makhija, (2003) does confirm that resources provide a 
distinct competitive advantage catalyst to good organizational performance.  
 
A good number of authors (Wernerfelt, (1984), Hoskisson et al, (2000), Caldeira, 2001, Makhija, (2003) 
etc) are in agreement that firm resources (both tangible and intangible) are meaningful firm performance 
drivers only if they are 1) valuable, 2) rare, 3) imperfectly imitable and 4) not perfectly substitutable. 
(Makhija,( 2003) takes the theory a step further by emphasizing on what he calls ‘competitive capability’, 
this, he explains is made up of three primary components, a)Knowledge of underlying efficiency, 
b)Entrepreneurial ability and c) a firm’s Institutional networks and administrative heritage. Clearly, 
components a) and b) are tacitly residing within the firm’s management itself and as such, constitute part 
of a firm’s intangible resources.  SOE’s presents a very interesting case with respect to the RBT. It is very 
noble that resources do provide above average performance if they are rare and imperfectly imitable, in 
many cases SOEs still remain monopolies under legislation, giving them sole and exclusive rights to own 
and operate specialized assets, typical examples include power transmission assets owned by electricity 
corporations and telecommunication transmitters owned by telecommunication corporations operating in 
restricted industry environments, are these SOEs taking advantage of the rare and imperfectly imitable 
resource they have?  
 
2.6. Theory compatibility  
 
Whilst under the agency theory, corporate governance measures have over the years developed to guard 
the actions of the supposedly self-centered managers [agents] against relegating the principals interest, the 
agency problem continues to exist in the SOE scene mainly because it is rarely clear who precisely 
represents the principal [state] (Toninelli, (2000). There have however been some cases where the 
politicians, acting as the principal has exerted enough pressure on SOEs and put in place enough 
incentives and policies that fully supported agents to act in the principal’s interest. On the other hand, 
some SOE failure cases have been attributed to the agency problem itself (Fudanga & Mwaba, (2006) and 




Under the public choice theory, SOEs have been thought to fail as a result of excessive influence of 
politicians on the decision making and operations of such enterprises, such political figures having been 
appointed to office by the voting public which in turn does not have any motive to monitor their decisions 
and performance (Mwaura,( 2007). This theory therefore, tends to imply that SOEs will operate in line 
with the interest of the politicians and not necessarily on management’s self-interest thereby undermining 
the core principles under the agency theory, the result of which would be poor performance (Brouthers et 
al, (2007).  Etukudo, (1997) in agreement with Bozec et al, (2002) argues that SOEs can be steered 
towards good performance provided their relations with governments are well defined; this is suggestive 
of a public choice theory- induced problem.   
 
The stakeholder theory holds that in an organizational set up, interests of all stakeholders should be 
reconciled and managed in a manner that brings about optimal firm performance, it has been established 
that in an SOE set up such interest can be difficult to reconcile as the stakeholders are diverse in nature 
and possess very divergent interests (Heath,( 2004). The public choice theory on the other hand seems to 
be in conflict with the view that stakeholder interests can be reconciled as it clearly views political 
interests as possessing supreme influence to the detriment of good performance (Mwaura, (2007).  
 
The stewardship theory views managers as good wardens of the principals who will always act in the best 
interest of such principals, the agency problem (under the agency theory) has been proven in a good 
number of cases (Liang et al, (2012) and Qian (1996), with managers acting not in the best interest of the 
enterprise owners but rather on that of their own, or worse even in the interest of powerful politicians.  
 
The discussion above indicates that factors affecting and influencing SOE performance are diverse and no 
single theory has been conclusively found to best explain predict and them. There is thus a clear case of a 
gap and conundrum in literature and subsequently in policy in explaining SOE performance. This gap and 
conundrum is what the current thesis aims at filling and explaining.   
  
2.7. Empirical Literature 
 
A number of empirical studies exist on SOE performance. These include a study by the World Bank 
(2007) that identifies five governance related problems that have persistently led to SOEs poor 
performance in the developing world. The identified governance problems which in essence are agency 
theory related were unclear ownership objectives, weak owners, low transparency levels, lack of 




In their study investigating the effect of market structure on SOE performance, (Goldeng et al, (2004) 
established competition as a determinant of performance; specifically that competition can be detrimental 
to SOE performance, this is consistent with other literature suggesting that operational margins tend to be 
depressed with competition (Perevalov et al, (1999). Reliance on state debt finance has been found to be 
negatively correlated to performance of state enterprises, in support of the resource based theory, an 
efficient use of resources has been found to improve SOE performance (Majumdar, (1996). Whilst (Berg 
et al, (2005) establish industry regulation to be an influential factor in the Ukraine electricity industry, 
they also find SOEs to be less responsive to any regulatory related incentives than their private sector 
counterparts and this is said to be mainly due to political pressures that tend to disincentivise SOE 
managers.  
 
(Kim & Chung,( 2008) established a positive correlation between government pressure on 22 SOEs and 
their performance outcomes in Korea. The authors found empirical evidence to the effect that with 
appropriate pressures from government, SOEs can perform even if there is no intention to privatize. This 
is consistent with empirical evidence by (Aivazian et al, (2005) who found that in China, corporatization 
of SOEs improved their performance without an element of privatization.  (Moushibahou, (2010) also 
finds through an empirical study that in Hungary, Poland and the UK, firms improved performance during 
a period leading to privitisation and not necessarily thereafter, meaning that indeed with appropriate 
pressures from the relevant stakeholders SOE performance can be improved without privitisation.  The 
author further finds that unlike within OECD countries where privitisation resulted in marginal 
performance improvement privatised African firms reported no significant improvements in performance 
(measured by profitability, efficiency, output and leverage).  
 




 As shown in Table 1, the data is on twenty four (24) SOEs from nine African countries operating in 
seven (7) different industries and covers a period from 2001 to 2012, thus giving it a panel framework. . 
SOEs considered are only those where government has a shareholding in excess of fifty percent. The 
study takes only SOEs whose principal source of revenue is customer charges (fares and tariffs), as such it  
excludes government agencies which, although semi-autonomous depend materially on subventions and 






Table 1: Countries and Industries Covered in the Study 
  
 
Data on the SOEs constituting the sample is predominantly obtained from the audited annual financial 
statements and other publicized annual reports of these entities. This information has been obtained from 
the websites of the SOEs, where available whilst in some cases hard copies have been formally requested 
and granted. The audited annual financial statements mainly provide quantitative data whilst the rest of 
qualitative information is mainly available from narratives in the annual reports (e.g. size of work force, 
extent of stakeholder reporting, strength of the board etc.). 
 
The study also refers to relevant legislation and/or applicable industry policy framework within the 
countries providing the sample SOEs. Such includes enabling acts of parliament which, in most cases 
exist to first and foremost establish the SOEs, specify their mandate and purpose, powers and governance, 
among others. The regulatory framework (or lack thereof) of industries in which the SOEs in sample 
operate is also ascertained through the perusal of relevant acts of parliament, and through such very 
pertinent data is obtained and this concerns the pricing mechanisms, competition and competitive 
practices and issues of consultation, among others.    
The study variables are defined and measured as per table 2 below, which also indicates their predicted 
relationships with firm performance: 
 
Table 2: Definition of variables and their predicted relationship with performance 
Variable Measurers Predicted relationships 
Liquidity (LIQ) 
 
              
                   
 
Higher liquidity is positively 
related to performance 
Gearing (GEA) 
 
            
                           
 
Higher gearing is negatively 
related to performance 
Workforce (WKF) = total headcount Size of workforce is 
positively related to 
performance 
South Africa 8 Power 5
Botswana 5 Postal 3
Namibia 3 Telecommunications 3
Mauritius 2 Water & Sannitation 6
Swaziland 1 Airlines 4
Lesotho 1 Rail & Transport 2
Kenya 1 MiningServices 1







Extent of Government’s 
Involvement in Pricing 
Decisions (GPD) 
Score =0 if Tariffs and related 
pricing are subject to final 
approval by government 
 
Score = 1 if pricing is left to 
market forces, including where 
regulation is by an independent 
body) 
The extent of government 
involvement is negatively 
related to performance 
Existence of Competition 
(COMP) 
Score =0 if  there is no service 
provider or products which are 
perfect substitutes to what is 
offered by the SOE 
 
Score =1 if  there is 1 or more 
service providers or products 
which are perfect substitutes to 
what is offered by the SOE 
Competition is positively 
related to performance 
Strength of Board (BDS) Score = 5 if  board has within it 
the following skills: i)industry 
specific  ii) Financial management 
iii) Environmental  and social 
Management iv) Legal v) Human 
Capital Management v)  
Score = 4 if  only 4 of the above 
Score = 3 if  only 3 of the above 
Score = 2 if  only 2 of the above 
Score = 1 if  only 1 of the above 
Strength of boards is 
positively related with 
performance 
Extent of Stakeholder 
representation on board 
(STKRB) 
Score = 5 if  board has within it 
representatives from the following 
: i)Public Sector  ii) Private Sector  
iii) Civic Organizations iv) Legal v) 
General Public   
Score = 4 if  only 4 of the above 
Score = 3 if  only 3 of the above 
Score = 2 if  only 2 of the above 
Score = 1 if only 1 of the above 
Wider stakeholder 
representation on boards is 
positively related to 
performance 
Extent of Stakeholder Reporting 
(STKRB) 
Score = 5 if  annual reporting 
extensively cover the following 
areas: i)Financial Outcomes  ii) 
Human Capital Issues  iii) 
Corporate Social Responsibility iv) 
Environment, climate change and 
social issues) v) operational 
reviews 
Score = 4 if  only 4 of the above 
Score = 3 if  only 3 of the above 
Score = 2 if  only 2 of the above 
Score = 1 if only 1 of the above 
Extensive stakeholder 
reporting is positively 
related to performance 
Financial Dependency on 
Government (FINDEP) 
= measured by the proportion of 
government’s capital (shares of all 
classes and/or equivalent) to total 
Dependence on government 




shareholder funds (including 
accumulated retained 
earnings/losses) 
Existence of an independent 
industry regulator (REG) 
= When there is a recognized 
industry regulator dully enacted 
by an act of parliament, and its 
decisions are not subject to 
automatic review by government 
Existence of an independent 
regulator is negatively 
related to performance 
Age (AGE) = number of years the SOE has 
been in operation as an SOE 
(excludes any number of years the 
entity may have operated as a 
government department) 
Age and SOE performance 
are positively related 
 
 
3.2. Measure of Performance 
Various studies have measured performance in different way, with some focusing on productivity and 
profitability (Majumdar, 1997, Menozzi and Urtiaga, 2009, Xu et al, (2001) whilst some attempt to use 
more broad based measures encompassing operational efficiency, productivity, employment, output and 
value creation (Cheung et al, (2012), Kanyoma, (2008), Omran,  (2001), Omran, (2002), Clive,( 2004) 
etc). We attempt to combine both profitability and efficiency measures by defining performance in terms 
of Profitability, Return on Assets,  Capital Productivity (Asset Turnover),  Value Created per equity, 
labour  productivity (Revenue per employee)  and operational efficiency (debtor and creditor days). 
Whilst other measures like customer satisfaction, delivery on social objectives and rate of access to 
services would have been more ideal, this could not be fit into the context of this study since these are 




3.3. Model Estimation 
We adopt the model proposed by (Deventer and Malatesta, ( 2001) and adopted by Bozec et al,( 2001). 
This model is augmented by allowing for a vector of organizational theories which are then 
operationalized through a number of proxy variables and we test our hypothesis using a regression model 
as follows: 
 
    =    +           +                                                       
          +           +                )(control                                                                  (1)                                                                                                       





                         = SOE performance-the dependent Variable  
 
LIQ         = Liquidity  
GEA        = Gearing   
GPD        =Extent of Government’s involvement in pricing decisions 
FDP         = Extent of financial support from Government 
COMP     =Existence/nonexistence of industry competition 
          = Board Score 
STKR     = Extent of Balanced stakeholder reporting 
STKR     = Extent of stakeholder representation on Board 
SIZ  = Size 
FINDEP= Financial Dependency on government 
Control = This is a variable that might affect SOE performance, age (as measured by the number of years 
in operation) 
  = Error term 
 
The regression model proposed above has been empirically estimated using linear mixed model 
within the framework of longitudinal data analysis. Linear mixed modeling approach was 
selected because of the two main reasons: first, its flexibility of handling both time variant and 
time invariant variables in the model, second the need to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
across the firms and countries. The estimation was done using STATA version 13. The linear 
mixed model approach adapted here is mainly used in natural science. However, at least in 
theory it is expected to produce equivalent results to standard panel data approach. The choice of 
the mixed model is motivated by the need to include time invariant variables especially industry 
in our model which is not accommodate by a standard fixed model using panel approach. The 
econometric formulation of the model is as follows: iiiii vZXY    
Where i = 1 . . .N firms 
j = 1 . . . ni observations for firm i 
Yi = ni × 1 response vector for firm i 
Xi = ni × p design matrix for the fixed effects 
β = p × 1 vector of unknown fixed parameters 
Zi = ni × r design matrix for the random effects 
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Vi = r × 1 vector of unknown random effects ~ N(0,∑v) 




Separate regression equation was estimated for each of the Performance measures as 
demonstrated  below (All monetary figures have been converted to the USD equivalent): 
 
      =    +           +                                                       
          +            +                )(control                                                                  (2) 
                                                   
 
: Where RoA is Return on Assets measured as Operating Profits/Book Value of Capital Assets
 
 
                       =    +           +                                             
                    +            +                )(control                                            (3)                                               
    
 
: Where Asset Turnover Ratio is measured as Total Revenue/Book Value of Capital Assets
 
 
                       =    +           +                                   
                              +            +                )(control                      (4)                                                              
                                               
 
: Where Revenue per employee is measured as Total Operational Revenue/ Total number of full time 
employees 
 
                           =    +           +                                   
                              +            +                )(control                      (5)                                                    
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3.4. Operationalization of Organizational theories and hypothesis 
 
Table 3: Summary of proxy variables per theory 
 
 
i) Resource Based Theory 
  
This theory asserts that organizations are bundles of resources, and how much resources an entity has will 
determine how good a firm may perform (Grant, (1991). Organizational resources vary in nature; our 
study selects both financial resources (as measured by financial strength, i.e. Liquidity and Gearing) as 
well as non-financial resources (size of workforce).  If the Resource Based Theory holds, SOEs with more 
of these resources will perform better that those with less.  Higher liquidity levels (measured as a ratio of 
current assets to current liabilities) would imply that the SOE has more financial resources (short term) to 
take advantage of favourable supplier terms, avoid short term financing costs, take advantage of business 
opportunities as and when they arise, raise finance income etc. On the other hand, the higher the  gearing 
ratio (i.e. proportion of debts to total capital employed) is, the more an SOE  relies on borrowed financing 
resources,  which normally would not only come at a cost but also with restrictive conditions, and thus 
becoming a deterrent to good performance. Similarly,   assuming efficiency, SOEs with a larger 
workforce would have access to a wider range of skill and expertise and stand a better chance to respond 











Extent of Government’s Involvement in Pricing Decisions 
Existence of Competition 
Agency theory Strength of Board 
Stakeholder Theory Extent of Stakeholder representation on board 
Extent of Stakeholder Reporting 
Public Choice 
Theory 
Financial Dependency on Government 
Existence of an independent industry regulator 




Hypothesis: The more resources a firm has, the better will be its performance.  
 
ii) Stewardship theory 
 
With this theory, the position is that managers are good stewards and will always act in the best interest of 
the entities they lead and towards good performance. This theory further postulates that trustworthy and 
cooperative relationships between principals and stewards are positively correlated with firm performance 
(Tian and Lau, (2001). Our study takes the view that under this theory, the level of influence and control 
principals, being the government (and by extension the public) have on the stewards can among other 
things be judged by the government’s direct involvement in pricing and financing decisions as well as 
weather competition has been allowed in a given industry. The stewardship theory will be confirmed in 
cases where the government is minimally involved in pricing decisions and the industry has been opened 
to competition, and the expectation will be that the stewards (the managers) will focus on driving good 
performance. A score of 0 is awarded when tariffs and prices levied by SOEs are subject to final 
approvals by the political leadership, the score is changed to 1 in cases where such pricing is left to 
competitive forces (in most cases with an element of independent industry regulation). Government’s 
direct involvement in pricing decision is expected to lower performance. On the other hand, competition 
is deemed to exist where there is at least one provider of similar or perfect substitute products and 
services. A score of 1 represents competition and a 0 signifies lack of competition.  
Hypothesis: Performance will be better in SOEs where much is left to the stewards to run operations.  
iii) Agency Theory 
 
The agency theory holds the view that in organizations there exists an agent-principal problem, this being 
caused by the agents (managers of the organizations) focusing on their own interest to the detriment of 
organizational goals. In many cases the interests [and needs] of the agents do not reconcile with those of 
their principals thereby fueling the agent-principal problem (Ross, (1973) and Leech, (1986), and this 
takes a strong board to resolve (Ongore and K’Obonyo, (2011). However, a board of directors can only be 
as effective as it is strong. In this study, the strength of the board is measured in terms of the extent of 
diversity amongst board members (education and professional discipline) as well as the existence of sub 
committees, a score ranging between 1 and 5 is then assigned where 5 is assigned to a board deemed to be 
very strong as indicated in Table 2 above. Performance is expected to be better amongst SOEs with strong 
Boards.  
 





iv) Stakeholder theory 
 
At its core, this theory is based on the premise that values are an absolute necessity in doing business. 
According to the proponent, (Freeman, (1994), such values must be reflective of reconciled needs and 
interest of all stakeholders of an entity. Ordinarily, for this theory to hold, better performing SOEs will be 
those that incorporate interest of all their stakeholders in the way they do business. This theory is of 
particular interest in an SOE set up, where organizational objectives, hence stakeholder interests may 
conflict with each other (e.g. financial Vs Social). Our study measures this by two perspectives namely 
the extent of representation of various stakeholders on the board and the extent to which annual reporting 
captures interest of all stakeholders. The study considers stakeholder representation on boards to be high 
when the following groups are represented; public sector, private sector, general public and civic 
organizations. Similarly, the study considers the extent to which SOE annual reporting is sensitive to the 
needs of various stakeholder by extensively covering the following areas; environmental and social 
perspectives, corporate social responsibility, corporate governance, financial and social. Scores ranging 
between 1 and 5 are assigned, where 5 is the highest ( See table 2 above). SOEs which have a broader 
representation of stakeholders in their boards and produce annual reports that are sensitive to needs of 
various stakeholders will perform better.  
   
Hypothesis: SOEs capturing interests of all their stakeholders will perform better than those which does 
less so.  
 
v) Public Choice 
 
This organizational theory appeals very much to an SOE set up, it posits that although players in the 
political scene have some concern for the interest of others; such concern is minimal as the primary 
interest they serve is theirs. SOEs are state’s own vehicles for service delivery, and since states are run 
and directed by politicians, it follows that politicians may have an upper hand in the direction of SOEs. 
Studies (Kathrn et al, (2001)and Bozec et al, (2002) have found that in SOEs focus can be diverted to 
achieving socio political goals [in some cases for political expediency] to the detriment of sustainable 
performance. Our study considers the extent of government’s stake compared to total equity position, 
with a higher level of equity held by government being indicative of a higher degree of dependence on 
government resources (See table 2 above), and hence a presumed higher level of political control and 
influence.  On the other hand, the existence of an independent regulator duly established under laws and 
whose decisions are not subject to further government approvals is taken to be indicative of lessor 
political influence and control over SOEs being regulated.     





Table 4a summarizes the key statistics and results for six regression models are presented in tables 4b and 
c. The SOE performance measurements are presented in the third to six column and the first column 
represents the theoretical underpinning and the row represents the independent variables included in the 
model. In most occasion, age, size, extent of government involvement in pricing decision and extent of 
stakeholder representation on board   and gearing have a significant negative influence on performance 
for most of the proxies used.  
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According to the results in table 4c postal services, railway, water and sanitations are consistently 
statistically significant regardless of the performance proxy used. By and large the three industries had 
lower performance when compared to airline industry except for value created per equity and debtor days. 
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5. Discussion of Results 
 
We note from table 4a that the liquidity variable has a significant influence only when SOE performance 
is measured in terms of revenue per employee and creditor days, under which the relationship is positive 
as expected. This finding is in concurrence with a number of studies (Tang and Peng, (2003), Singh,  
(1986), Bromiley , (1991), Leiblein ,(1996), Hambrick and D’Aveni , (1988), Chudson, (1945) which 
have found that firm liquidity have a positive influence on firm’ performance. According to corporate 
finance literature, optimal liquidity levels generally allow for competitive supplier terms, permit early 
payment discounts to be exploited, facilitate supplier preferential treatment and special pricing 
arrangements etc. The likelihood of interrupted production is kept low through continuous availability of 
the necessary inputs whilst short term financing costs incurred by the less liquid firms are often replaced 
by short term finance income earned, all these would be expected to result in improved firm performance. 
For liquidity to remain a variable of no statistical significance under the rest of the performance measures 
is surprising, but it perhaps suffers from endogeneity problem since accumulation and/or maintenance of 
sufficient levels of current assets and sustainable current liability level may to some degree be a result of a 
track record of performance, whilst on the other hand its good performance that would lead to healthy 




Our results show gearing levels to be significantly and negatively correlated to SOE performance when 
return on assets, revenue per employee and creditor days are used as measures of performance, whilst the 
relationship is of no statistical significance under the rest of the measurers. The inverse relationship 
between gearing levels and SOE performance is as per expectations; debt generally has the effect of 
eroding the available free cash flows (Jansen, (1986)  thus contributing to even lower liquidity levels, 
which may explain the reported results of its negative effect on performance.  
 
Consistent with findings by (Akhtar et al (2012), our results support the hypothesis that, the more the 
resources an SOE has, the better it will perform, and this has to be dependent on how uniquely and 
strategically those resources are combined in pursuit of performance objectives (Hamel & Prahalad, 
(1994). SOE managers do have the capability of leveraging on the resources at the disposal of their firms 
to bring about good performance and this is in support of the resource based theory. 
 
We also establish a positive link between the size of SOEs and their performance. Larger firms often face 
higher levels of scrutiny and more pressure to deliver better results, partly due to their level of strategic 
importance (Lioukas et al (1993) and it has been established that government pressure alone can, and 
more often does steer SOE performance in the right direction (Kim and Chung, (2008), Aivazian et al 
2005,  Moushibahou,  (2010).   A further explanation to a positive and significant relationship between a 
firm performance and its size is offered by (Penrose, 1959, cited in Majumdar, (1997) who postulates that 
larger firms have diverse capabilities, abilities to exploit economies of scale and a better scope for 
formalized and standardized procedures. Whilst governments may be splitting SOEs into smaller, 
specialized or regionally focused entities, our results suggest that benefits associated with larger but well 
managed SOEs get lost in the process, it is therefore imperative that the focus be on finding the optimal 
size than just getting smaller.   
 
Government’s involvement in service and product pricing decisions has a negative influence on SOE 
performance and this is consistent under the following measures of performance: return on assets, asset 
turnover, debtor days and creditor days. If good performance is to be the goal of SOEs, good managers 
faced with appropriate choices are capable of making the right decisions which will bring about such 
good performance, as such our results do support the stewardship theory.  However the results do not 
show competition as having any influence of statistical significance on SOE performance under a number 
of the performance measures we use, significance is only reflected when the measure is debtor days and 
creditor days but with opposing correlation. Under the debtor day’s measure competition is reflected to 
have a positive influence on SOE performance whilst the reverse occurs under the creditor day’s measure. 
The results do not seem to reflect anything conclusive and this has been the trend with other studies in the 
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subject, whilst some studies on SOEs have suggested competition to be having an effect of reducing 
performance margins (Perevalov et al, (1999, Sappington 2003), others (Carlin et al, (2006)) find 
opposing effects of competition on SOE performance depending on the performance measure 
used, although they conclude that competitive pressure has importance on productivity.  
 
In concurrence with the agency theory, this study confirms the hypothesis that the existence of stronger 
boards in SOEs does lead to better performance thereby suggesting that as much as the agency problem 
exists in SOEs, where it is often found to be deeper and more complex (Menozzi, (2009), the use of 
strong boards can curb the problem as postulated by (Ongore and K’Obonyo, (2011). This finding is 
consistent with a number of studies that have concluded the same (Irwin and Yamamoto, (2004). Whilst 
some governments have attempted to appoint strong boards to SOEs, the downside has been that in some 
cases such boards are political appointees, or politicians themselves. The presence of heavy political 
influence on boards have been found to have a negative impact on SOE performance (Menozzi, (2009) 
and this is because political directives quite often overrules good governance and objective rationale 
(Berg et al, (2005). It is therefore of paramount importance for governments to consider limiting political 
presence, at least of a direct nature in the governing of state owned enterprises.  
 
We also find that SOEs that have a wider stakeholder representation on their boards perform better than 
the ones with less, and this is consistently so when the measures of performance used are asset turnover, 
value created per equity and debtor days. This does suggest that the stakeholder theory holds, however, 
the position held by other studies (Donaldson and Preston, (1995) Heath and Norman, (2004), 
Wicaksono, (2009) that in an SOE set up, attempting to cater for all stakeholders will only hamper 
performance due to the divergent nature of their interests is also confirmed when the performance 
measure is revenue per employee. A possible explanation for this is that  reconciling needs of divergent 
SOE stakeholders will always be a challenge if performance is to matter, the interest are just too diverse. 
Perhaps this further confirms the biggest criticism of this theory by (Donaldson and Preston, (1995) that it 
fails to realize that stakeholders, particularly so in the case of SOEs are often multiple and pursuing 
conflicting interests. Whilst nothing conclusive can be said in respect of the stakeholder theory under this 
study, a leaf can certainly be borrowed from (Heath and Norman, (2004) who postulate that some 
stakeholder interests may be subordinated for the interest of the overall objective. As noted above, this 
study have found that in concurrence with the agency theory defining a good board composition in terms 
of skill and expertise tends to lead to better performance, rather than focusing too much on drawing from 




Our results establish a negative link between dependency on government funding and firm performance 
under the creditor days, return on assets measures and debtor days. This result could be explaining the 
fact that where government’s financial involvement is high, so will be political influence and interference, 
which has been found to lead to lower performance over time (Xu et al, (2001), Kathrn et al, (2001) 
Bozec et al, (2002). It has been established, as we present above, that SOEs have the capability to perform 
better  with less political influence, and this for one can be through affording autonomy to those in charge, 
but as (Bortolotti & Pinotti, (2008) rightly argues, everything begins with the right political will to let go, 
therefore the public choice theory is confirmed by the study.   
 
We find industry regulation to be positively correlated to SOE performance when asset productivity 
measures (return on asset and asset turn over) are used, this further confirms the public choice theory as 
independent market regulation generally has the effect of limiting political influence. This result is 
consistent with a number of previous studies (Arnold et al, 2009, Wallsten, (2002, Karamti and 
Kammoun, (2012). The positive correlation between industry regulation and firm performance has been 
attributed to the fact that such regulation tends to moderate the economic rents available in the market, 
Daveri et al, (2010). It is therefore recommendable for governments to seriously engage in giving 
industry and market regulatory functions to duly set up autonomous regulatory bodies, and care should be 
exercised in avoiding these entities becoming yet other SOEs quite inefficient even more than the ones 
they are meant to regulate.  
   
The age of an SOE is found to be a positive influence on performance and this is consistent under the 
creditor days, value created per equity, revenue per employee and debtor days performance measures, 




Well-resourced SOEs will perform better than those with fewer resources, and this supports the Resource 
Based Theory. However, for resources to lead to better performance they need to be of value and 
managers need to be good stewards in uniquely applying such resources for the attainment of objectives, 
including value addition. Governments therefore need to keep SOE’s optimally resourced, but bearing in 
mind that resources on their own may turn out to be wastage if not optimally utilised.  
 
Although the government’s involvement in SOE service and product pricing decisions is often seen as to 
ensure affordability by consumers, such an involvement suppresses SOE performance over time.  
Governments should therefore, to the best extent possible, equip SOE managers with necessary skills to 
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make decisions under appropriate oversight mechanisms as our results suggest that the stewardship theory 
hold to some extent. This tie with our finding that the agency theory holds in SOEs, as we find that 
performance was much better in SOEs where boards are stronger.   
 
Whilst the stakeholder theory has been hailed to assist in driving better firm performance by proponents, 
the same cannot be said for SOEs, where attempts to balance the divergent needs of a variety of 
stakeholder is found to impact negatively on firm performance. Balancing the needs of all stakeholders 
can however still be achieved provided it’s carried out in a well-crafted hierarchical manner, where the 
overall objectives are not subordinated or relegated to competing needs of various groups.    
  
Government influence and political control will quite often manifest itself self when SOEs (often 
monopolies) operate in an industry without an independent regulator, i.e. where the government itself is 
the regulator. The same strong position of governments exists when an SOE depends heavily on 
government for financing needs. We establish and conclude that these characteristics lead lower 
performance, thereby confirming public choice view.  
 
In summary, the results our study suggest that SOE performance can be explained and predicted in terms 
of the resource based theory, agency theory, stewardship theory and the public choice theory. Our results 
do not bring out anything conclusive about the stakeholder theory at this stage.  
 
These results are preliminary and subject to further enhancements through application of a wider range of 
performance measures and proxy variables as well as refined methodology. However they bring to light a 
few contradictions though, for instance if managers are good stewards as confirmed by the study, why do 
SOEs with less stronger boards perform below those with stronger boards? If stronger boards can drive 
SOEs to an above average performance, does this mean they can wither political influence under the 
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